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Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages:
Empirical Analyses Using the Civil
Justice Survey of State Courts 1992,
1996, and 2001 Data
Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Michael Heise,
Neil LaFountain, G. Thomas Munsterman, Brian Ostrom, and
Martin T. Wells*
We analyze thousands of trials from a substantial fraction of the nation’s
most populous counties. Evidence across 10 years and three major data sets
suggests that: (1) juries and judges award punitive damages in approxi-
mately the same ratio to compensatory damages, (2) the level of punitive
damages awards has not increased, and (3) juries’ and judges’ tendencies to
award punitive damages differ in bodily injury and no-bodily-injury cases.
Jury trials are associated with a greater rate of punitive damages awards in
financial injury cases. Judge trials are associated with a greater rate of
punitive damages awards in bodily injury cases.
I. Introduction
Concerns about punitive damages—especially juries’ role—persist and con-
tinue to inform legal reform debates. Recent Supreme Court opinions
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Center for State Courts (NCSC); Heise is Professor, Cornell Law School; Munsterman is Prin-
cipal Court Management Consultant, NCSC; LaFountain is Court Management Consultant,
NCSC; Ostrom is Principal Court Research Consultant, NCSC; Wells is Professor of Statistics,
Department of Social Statistics, Cornell University, Professor of Clinical Epidemiology, Cornell
University Weill Medical College, and Elected Member of the Law Faculty, Cornell University.
We thank participants in faculty workshops at Texas and Marquette for useful comments on
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reflect judicial discomfort with significant punitive damage awards.1 Some
commentators suggest that greater reliance on judges and a corresponding
diminution in reliance on juries to award and set punitive damage levels will
improve civil justice.2 Other commentators, however, either regard the reli-
ance on the jury as a strength of the American justice system or question calls
for reducing jurors’ power absent evidence of judges’ comparative superior-
ity.3 The growing empirical dimension of these debates advances our under-
standing about axioms critical to reform suggestions. Nevertheless, even
well-designed empirical studies analyzing identical data sometimes point
in different directions owing, in part, to debates about appropriate model
specifications, assumptions, and statistical techniques.4
This study joins the scholarly and policy debates about judge and jury
differences in relation to punitive damages by analyzing a new data set. A
newly released data cohort, combined with prior cohorts, permits unprec-
edented analyses of judge and jury punitive damages behavior over time.
Our study explores two broad issues: the relation between compensatory and
punitive damages and the rates at which judges and juries award punitive
damages. Our findings reveal that judges and juries perform similarly in
1See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (noting that
punitive damages can pose an “acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property”), quoting
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 585–86 (1996) (finding that punitive damages were constitutionally excessive).
2Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. Legal
Stud. 1, 2 (2004) (arguing that juries are more likely to award punitive damages and their awards
are larger); David Schkade et al., Deliberating about Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 Colum. L.
Rev. 1139 (2000); Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s
Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 901, 916 (1998); Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not
Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 179 (1998).
3E.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Neil LaFountain, Brian Ostrom, David Rottman & Martin T. Wells,
Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 743 (2002)
(finding no substantial evidence suggesting that jurors and judges differ in the rate of awarding
punitive damages or in the relation between punitive and compensatory awards); Richard
Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damages Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for
Change, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 867 (1999); Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive
Damages and Legal Pluralism, Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1439 (1999); Michael L. Rustad, How the
Common Good Is Served by the Remedy of Punitive Damages, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 793 (1997).
4See, e.g., Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 2, at 30 (identifying sources of disagreement with the
Eisenberg et al. study).
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some punitive damages tasks and differently in others. Some of these find-
ings comport with our previous findings; other findings surprise and provide
more texture to analytical comparisons between judges and juries.
With respect to the relation between the size of punitive and compen-
satory awards, one aspect critical to recent Supreme Court decisions,5 we find
no substantial evidence that judges and juries behave differently in any
meaningful and systematic manner. Indeed, we find no serious disagree-
ment in the literature on this. Conditional on the existence of a punitive
award, virtually all data sets reveal a strikingly strong association between the
size of the punitive award and the size of the compensatory award. With
respect to the decision to award punitive damages, more refined analyses of
case types reveal that judges are more likely to award punitive damages to
successful plaintiffs in cases involving bodily injury (other than motor vehicle
cases). Conversely, juries are more likely to award punitive damages in cases
where successful plaintiffs did not suffer bodily injury.
Caution prompts us to cast our findings in the negative. The stream of
cases that wind up in front of judges and juries differs and these differences
preclude bolder and more robust assertions about differences between judge
and jury behavior. Simply put, because the data do not permit judge-jury
comparisons with identical case streams (or a more perfectly controlled
research design), we cannot be certain how judges and jurors would have
behaved had they decided identical cases. Even our negative findings make
clear, however, that assessments of judge-jury differences in the world of
punitive damages require continued careful analyses and benefit greatly
from more and better data. Data reveal a more nuanced and complex
picture of judge and jury behavior than does conventional wisdom, which
typically rests precariously on unstudied assumptions and axioms.
The issues we address in this article transcend the standard debates
about optimizing rules of civil adjudication. Public debates about tort reform
endure and frequently focus on punitive damages and their role in the torts
“crisis” (real or perceived).6 Presidential candidates’ promises to do some-
5See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (“[I]n practice,
few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process.”).
6E.g., authorities cited supra notes 2 and 3 and infra note 8.
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thing can involve changes in punitive damages.7 Parallel debates continue to
simmer within the legal academy. Articles focusing on punitive damages
reform increasingly appear in leading student- and faculty-edited law
journals.8
Section II describes the data, which comprise trial outcomes punitive
damages decisions from three consistent data sets spanning 1991 though
2001. Section III presents descriptive results with particular emphasis on the
relation between compensatory and punitive damages. We find that a case’s
compensatory award persists as a strong predictor of the case’s punitive
award. This relation holds over time and applies to juries and judges. This
section also explores possible case types where differences emerge between
how juries and judges award punitive damages. Section IV reports regression
results that confirm the core results of Section III. Section V considers the
influence of selection effects on our results. Section VI concludes.
7E.g. http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/16/bush.malpractice/ (last visited
Jan. 30, 2005).
8Student-edited journals that have recently published punitive damages articles include the
University of Chicago Law Review (Mogin, supra note 2); Columbia Law Review (Schkade et al.,
supra note 2); Cornell Law Review (Eisenberg et al., supra note 3); Harvard Law Review (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
869 (1988)); Journal of Law & Politics (Denise E. Antolini, Punitive Damages in Rhetoric and
Reality: An Integrated Empirical Analysis of Punitive Damages Judgments in Hawaii, 1985–2001,
20 J.L. & Pol. 143 (2004)); and Yale Law Journal (Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as
Societal Damages, 113 Yale L.J. 347 (2003)). Examples of leading faculty-edited journal entries
include American Law & Economic Review (W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think about Risk? 1
Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 26 (1999)); Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (Catherine M. Sharkey,
Dissecting Damages: An Empirical Exploration of Sexual Harassment Awards, 3 J. Empirical
Legal Stud. 1 (2006); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Significant Association
Between Punitive and Compensatory Damages in Blockbuster Cases: A Methodological Primer,
3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 175 (2006)); Journal of Legal Studies (Thomas A. Eaton, David B.
Mustard & Susette M. Talarico, The Effects of Seeking Punitive Damages on the Processing of
Tort Claims, 34 J. Legal Stud. 343 (2005); Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 2; Theodore Eisenberg
et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. Legal Stud. 623 (1997)); Journal of Law &
Economics ( Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., On the Determinants and Importance of
Punitive Damage Awards, 42 J. Law & Econ. 527 (1999)); Journal of Risk & Uncertainty (Daniel
Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16
J. Risk & Uncertainty 49 (1998)); Law and Human Behavior ( Jennifer Robbenolt, Decision
Making: The Decisions of Citizens and Trial Court Judges, 26 Law & Hum. Behav. 315 (2002));
and Supreme Court Economic Review (Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of
Punitive Damages Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact of BMW v. Gore on Punitive
Damages Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards Will Be Reduced, 7 Sup. Ct. Econ.
Rev. 59 (1999)).
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II. Data
The “Civil Justice Survey of State Courts,” a project of the National Center for
State Courts (NCSC) and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), presents data
gathered directly from state court clerks’ offices on tort, contract, and prop-
erty cases disposed of by trial in fiscal year 1991–1992 and then calendar
years 1996 and 2001. The three separate data sets cover state courts of
general jurisdiction in a random sample of 46 of the 75 most populous
counties in the United States.9 The 75 counties sampled include approxi-
mately 33 percent of the 1990 U.S. population; the actual 45 counties con-
tributing data account for approximately 20 percent of the population.10 The
initial data set (1991–1992) includes only jury trials. The two subsequent data
sets, 1996 and 2001, include jury and bench trials, thereby allowing direct
comparisons between judge and jury trials. The three data sets include all
completed trials in all three years in most of the counties. Sampling in the
1992 and 1996 data sets is described in earlier publications. Sampling was
used in three counties in the 2001 data set, Cook County, Illinois, and
Philadelphia County and Bergen County, New Jersey.
These data are the most representative sample of state court trials in
the United States. With direct access to state court clerks’ offices, as well as
approximately 100 trained coders recording data, the information gathered
does not rely on litigants or third parties to report. Self-reports, common in
9The 2001 data included 46 counties; the 1991–1992 and 1996 data included 45. One county
included in the 1991–1992 and 1996 study, Norfolk, MA, fell out the nation’s 75 most populous
in the 2000 Census and was replaced by Mecklenburg County, NC, and El Paso County, TX. Two
Maryland counties declined to participate in the 1991–1992 study, and were replaced with
Fairfax County for all three iterations of the Civil Justice Survey.
10For a summary of the data and methodology, see Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Civil
Justice Survey of State Courts, 2001: Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001 (Apr.
2004) [hereinafter “BJS, 2001”]; Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Civil Justice Survey of State
Courts, 1996: Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties (1996) [hereinafter “BJS, 1996”];
Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 1992: Tort Cases in
Large Counties 6 (1995) [hereinafter “BJS, 1992”]. See also Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 2, at
10–13 (describing 1996 data); Eisenberg et al., supra note 3 (describing 1996 data); Michael
Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 Case Western
Res. Univ. L. Rev. 813, 822–27 (2000) (describing 1992 data).
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many commercial verdict reporters, typically overstate plaintiff win rates and
award levels.11
III. Civil Trials and Punitive Damages12
Civil complaints that culminate in a trial on the merits remain comparatively
rare events.13 Within this small subset of trials that reach a final verdict, those
that involve either judges or juries awarding punitive damages are similarly
infrequent. Table 1, which presents descriptive information for the sample
of 11,610 cases in which the plaintiff prevailed, illustrates that punitive
damages were awarded in less than than 5 percent of the cases (N = 551;
N = 539 for cases with nonzero compensatory award). Thus, applying any
realistic rate of filed cases reaching trial, less than 1 percent of civil actions
formally commenced resulted in the awarding of punitive damages. Conse-
quently, studies of punitive damages—such as ours—are necessarily studies
of unusual events.
A. Punitive Damages Award Patterns
Although judges and juries awarded punitive damages at roughly similar
rates (approximately 4 percent and 5 percent, respectively), jury trials domi-
nate our sample of punitive damages cases. Among the 551 cases in which
the plaintiff prevailed and punitive damages were awarded, juries decided
81.5 percent of the cases, with judges deciding the remaining 18.5 percent.
11Eisenberg et al., Predictability, supra note 8, at 641, n.53 (finding bias in commercial verdict
reporter samples); Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn A. Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New
Empirical Evidence, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 315, 324–26 (1999) (same); Erik K. Moller et al., Punitive
Damages in Financial Injury Jury Verdicts, 28 J. Legal Stud. 283, 335 (1999) (reporting reason-
able levels of confidence in the jury verdict reporters but acknowledging some potential bias).
See also Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Thomas Cohen (forthcoming) (finding that on average
jury verdict reporter data sets contained half the number of jury trials as were included in the
2001 Civil Justice Survey, trial outcomes were skewed toward higher plaintiff win rates, and
higher mean and median compensatory and punitive awards, but no difference in the rate of
punitive awards).
12Unless otherwise noted, the descriptive tables use raw, unweighted data.
13See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459, 509 tbl.5 (2004) (analyzing state courts
of general jurisdiction for 10 states from 1992–2002).
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The dominance of jury trials in our punitive damages cases data set largely
reflects civil litigants’ general preference for jury trials (77.9 percent of the
civil trials where plaintiffs won were decided by juries). A limitation in the
data set also exerts upward pressure on the percentage of punitive damage
awards from jury trials. Although the final two years of data cohorts (1996
and 2001) contain bench and jury trials, the initial data cohort (1991–1992)
contains punitive damages (177) from only jury trials.
Consistent with conventional wisdom, Table 1 reveals that jury trials
involved higher punitive and compensatory award levels than judge trials.14
14Compensatory damages were awarded in almost all cases in which the plaintiff prevailed and
punitive damages were awarded. In our data set of 551 cases in which the plaintiff prevailed and
punitive damages were awarded, there are 12 instances where the compensatory award was zero.
Table 1: Characteristics of Damages Awards
Jury Bench Combined
Total number of trials w/
plaintiff win
9,040 2,570 11,610
Number of trials w/ PD 438 101 539
Percent of trials w/ PD 4.85 3.93 4.64
PD Characteristics in Cases with PD
Mean ($ 2001) 3,016,691 461,118 2,557,262
SD 2.40 · (107) 3,204,604 2.18 · (107)
Mean log10(PD) 4.80 4.49 4.74
CD Characteristics in PD Cases (if CD  0)
Mean ($ 2001) 1,518,006 717,622 1,374,117
SD 7,767,222 3,848,419 7,224,816
Mean log10(CD) 5.04 4.77 4.99
Ratio of PD : CD (if CD  0)
Mean 2.90 1.60 2.66
SD 13.81 4.54 12.66
Median 0.62 0.66 0.62
Percent of PD Awards in the Range
$1 to 9,999 23.52 24.75 23.75
$10,000 to 99,999 34.7 45.54 36.73
$100,000 to 299,999 16.21 21.78 17.25
$300,000 to 999,999 13.24 4.95 11.69
$1,000,000 or more 12.33 2.97 10.58
Note: PD = punitive damages; CD = compensatory damages. Total cases N = 551, of which 539
had a nonzero compensatory award. Amounts are in inflation-adjusted 2001 dollars.
Source: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992–2001.
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Owing to substantial nonrandom case routing, however, juries and judges
saw different streams of cases. For example, plaintiffs demand higher
damages in jury trials15 and, as Table 2 suggests, jury trials involve more tort
cases while judges see more contract cases.16 These differences in the stream
of cases juries and judges see likely contribute to damages awards’ variation
in jury and bench trials.
Much of the angst over punitive damages concerns the largest awards
(or “blockbuster awards”17) that involve hundreds of millions or even billions
of dollars. At the high end of the punitive damage spectrum, and as Hersch
and Viscusi note,18 jury trials tended to dominate. As Table 1 illustrates,
however, most punitive awards were small. More than 23 percent of the
punitive awards were for less than $10,000; 60 percent were for less than
$100,000. On the other end of the distribution, less than 11 percent of the
cases involved punitive awards in excess of $1 million.
The different case streams that judges and juries saw help explain
differences in various case characteristics for bench and jury trials. Table 2
illustrates the salience of party status. Although judges saw more cases involv-
ing individuals suing other individuals, juries saw more cases involving
individuals suing hospitals, corporations, or governments (labeled as “non-
indiv”). Notably, cases with individuals as plaintiffs account for 88.5 percent
of the cases where punitive damages were awarded. Even greater variation
exists across case types. Intentional tort, fraud, employment, and motor
vehicle cases account for more than 55 percent of the pool of punitive
damages cases. At the more general case-category level, tort and contract
cases predominate, though contract cases with punitive awards likely have
a tort component since punitive damages generally are not available for
contract claims.
15See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1124, 1177 app. B. (1992); Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M.
Clermont, Trial by Judge or Jury: Which is Speedier? 79 Judicature 176, 180 (1996).
16See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1141 tbl.4; Eisenberg et al., Litigation
Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19 Seattle U. L. Rev. 433, 443 tbl.4.
17Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 2, at 4–10 tbl.1.
18Id. at 13–15 tbl.2 & fig.2 (reporting 1996 data).
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Table 2: Summary of Jury and Bench Trial Characteristics in Punitive
Damage Cases
Jury Bench Percent of Total Cases
Party Statusa
Individual vs. individual 135 47 35.0
Indivual vs. nonindividual 246 32 53.5
Nonindividual vs. nonindividual 49 11 11.5
Case Category
Torts 233 44 50.3
Contract 208 56 47.9
Property 8 2 1.8
Selected Case Types
Motor vehicle accident 57 3 11.0
Premises liability 18 7 4.6
Product liability (including asbestos) 8 1 1.6
Intentional tort 70 25 17.3
Medical and professional malpractice 26 3 5.3
Fraud 51 30 14.8
Employment discrimination or dispute 65 5 12.8
Rental/lease agreement 8 1 1.6
Selected Case Characteristics
Bodily injury (motor vehicle) 57 3 11.2
Bodily injury (non-motor-vehicle) 114 25 25.9
No bodily injury 266 72 62.9
States
Arizona 25 5 5.4
California 121 38 28.9
Connecticut 3 5 1.5
Florida 20 0 3.6
Georgia 24 0 4.4
Hawaii 5 1 1.1
Illinois 14 3 3.1
Indiana 3 1 0.7
Kentucky 18 2 3.6
Massachusetts 8 1 1.6
Michigan 2 0 0.4
Minnesota 6 1 1.3
Missouri 11 6 3.1
North Carolina 3 0 0.5
New Jersey 17 7 4.4
New York 10 1 2.0
Ohio 27 5 5.8
Pennsylvania 14 1 2.7
Texas 93 18 20.2
Virginia 18 3 3.8
Washington 3 1 0.7
Wisconsin 4 3 1.3
aEvery case, regardless of the number of potential plaintiff or defendant types, is assigned one
(of four) plaintiff or defendant type (individual, hospital, corporation, or government). For
those cases that involve multiple plaintiff or defendant types, cases are assigned based on a
hierarchy. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bulletin No. NCJ-202803, Civil Trial
Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, at 3 (Apr. 2004) (tbl.3 n.1).
Note: Total cases N = 551.
Source: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992–2001.
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Cases involving bodily injury occupy a special place in the popular lore
surrounding the American tort system.19 Due to the sizable presence of
motor vehicle torts in general, as well as in our punitive damages data set in
particular,20 we separate motor vehicle and non-motor-vehicle personal
injury cases. Consistent with the general overall distribution of jury and
bench trials that awarded punitive damages,21 Table 2 shows that 82 percent
of the non-motor-vehicle-related injury cases and 78 percent of the non-
injury cases went to a jury. Less consistent with the overall case trial mode
distribution is that 95 percent of motor vehicle injury cases went to a jury.
1. The Relation Between Compensatory and Punitive Damages
One of our principal lines of inquiry involves the relation between compen-
satory and punitive damages. Figures 1 and 2 permit visual inspections of
both trial modes for the three data cohorts.22 The scatterplots reveal a
consistent and shared pattern in the ratio of logged punitive and compen-
satory damage awards for judge and jury trials. Equally important is that this
general pattern persists over time.
Figure 1 is a scatterplot of punitive (log) and compensatory damages
(log) with jury and bench trials from all three data sets separately marked by
“J” and “B,” respectively. We use logarithmic scales because, as is often the
case with award amounts, linear scales fail to reveal the relation between the
variables.23 Figure 1 also includes the best-fitting regression lines for bench
19See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 9 (2000) (“Many people think of personal injury
cases when they think of tort law.”). Also, as shown below, cases involving bodily injury corre-
spond with markedly different propensities to award punitive damages by judges and juries. See
Section III.B.
20Of the 199 cases that involved bodily injuries, 60 (30.2 percent) involved motor vehicle
accidents.
21As Table 1 shows, of the 551 cases that awarded punitive damages, 81.5 percent were jury and
18.5 percent were bench trials.
22Recall in our description of our data the limitation that in 1992 data were gathered only from
jury trials. The two subsequent data cohorts include data on both judge and jury trials. See
Section II.
23Also, the untransformed punitive and compensatory award damages are not normally distrib-
uted, do not have a linear association, and, therefore, violate standard regression assumptions.
For a discussion of the need for logarithmic scales in punitive damage awards, and of the need
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and jury trials.24 Notably, the two regression lines that best describe the
relation between the compensatory and punitive damages award levels are
similar in terms of their slope and intercept. The overall patterns displayed
in Figure 1 are also consistent with those in previous studies.25 Moreover, the
greater visual dispersion around the jury trial regression line in Figure 1 is
confirmed by the lower R 2 value for a regression of compensatory damages
(log) on punitive damages (log).26
Figure 2 explores the relation between compensatory and punitive
damages in greater detail. It shows scatterplots for each of the data cohort
years by trial mode. These more refined plots allow us to assess whether the
general pattern that emerges in Figure 2 is robust to both time and trial
mode. Notably, the strong positive relation between compensatory and puni-
tive damages endures over time and between trial modes.
2. The Punitive-Compensatory Ratio
Additional insight is generated by describing the punitive-compensatory
relation with a single number for each case. A punitive-compensatory award
ratio is described by some scholars as a “widely cited barometer of whether a
for transformations to satisfy regression assumptions, see Eisenberg & Wells, The Significant
Association, supra note 8.
24Simple regression models of punitive damages (log) as the dependent variable and compen-
satory damages (log) as the explanatory variable, run separately for judge and jury trials and
using weighted data, yield the following results:
Trial Mode
Compensatory (Log)
Coefficient SE Intercept R2 N
Bench 0.897** 0.047 0.209 0.814 101
Jury 0.807** 0.050 0.751** 0.500 438
**p  0.01.
25See, e.g., Antolini, supra note 8 (we analyzed the Hawaii data made available on Professor
Antolini’s website); Eisenberg et al., Predictability, supra note 8, at 638 fig.3 (1991–1992 data);
Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, supra note 3, at 754 fig.1 (1996 data); Moller, supra note 11, at
300 n.52.
26See supra note 24.
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Figure 1 : Judge and jury punitive and compensatory (logs) damages.
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Figure 2 : Punitive and compensatory awards (logs) by trial mode and year.
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punitive damages award is out of line.”27 Moreover, Supreme Court consid-
eration of punitive damage limits involves such a ratio.28 We constructed our
compensatory-punitive damage award level (log) ratio by dividing the puni-
tive award (log) by the compensatory award (log).
Table 3 summarizes various punitive and compensatory damages ratios
by trial mode to facilitate comparisons. The ratio means and medians do not
differ significantly between bench and jury trials. Althouth the standard
deviations do differ, a test of the entire distributions precludes the rejection
of the hypothesis that they are the same (p = 0.429).29 The 95 percent con-
fidence intervals for the means of the ratios are narrow for both judge and
jury trials. For judge trials, the intervals range from 0.907 to 0.971. For jury
trials, the interval ranges from 0.946 to 0.994. This slightly narrower interval
range for jury trials likely is attributable to the greater number of jury trials.
The untransformed median ratios of punitive and compensatory awards for
27Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 2, at 9. Although Hersch and Viscusi report that juries award
punitive damages more frequently than judges, they do not question the very strong relation
between punitive and compensatory awards in the mass of cases. They do so only for what they
call “blockbuster” awards and even then report a significant relation between punitive and
compensatory awards. See also Eisenberg & Wells, The Significant Association, supra note 8
(showing substantial, statistically significant association between punitive and compensatory
awards in blockbuster cases).
28State Farm v. Campbell, supra note 1 (noting that to satisfy due process concerns, the punitive
and compensatory damages ratio will typically not exceed a single digit).
29This result is based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Table 3: Punitive-Compensatory Award Ratio by Trial Mode
Trial Mode Mean Ratio Median Ratio SD
Untransformed
Median Ratio N
Bench trial 0.939 0.956 0.163 0.602 101
Jury trial 0.970 0.959 0.258 0.612 438
Significance of bench-jury
trial difference
0.249 0.417 0.000 0.499
Note: Ratio is the ratio of punitive award (log) to compensatory award (log). Untransformed
ratio is the ratio of punitive award to compensatory award. The significance of means difference
is based on a t test; the significance of medians differences is based on a Mann-Whitney test; the
significance of standard deviations is based on an F test.
Source: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992–2001.
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jury trials is lower than in judge trials, though the untransformed median
bench and jury trial ratios do not significantly differ.30
Sample size is not the likely explanation for the absence of statistically
significant differences between bench and jury trials in their respective ratios
of punitive and compensatory awards. Perfectly designed and executed
studies may nevertheless fail to uncover socially important differences
because the statistical procedures lacked the power to detect the effect
flowing from a small sample size.31 A power calculation shows that to be 80
percent confident of detecting a 10 percent difference in the ratios’ means,
at a 0.05 significance level, requires 148 jury and 34 judge trials.32 Our sample
size exceeds these requirements.
Figure 3 presents kernel density estimates33 of the distributions of the
compensatory-punitive damages award level ratios for jury and bench trials.
Visual inspection reveals some differences in the shape of the distributions
for bench and jury trials. Specifically, the distribution of the jury trial
compensatory-punitive damages award level ratios is more “spread” than the
bench trial distribution. More striking, however, is the substantial similarity
between the distributions and that the differences in the bench and jury trial
distributions do not achieve statistical significance.
3. Award Ratios Over Time
Figure 4 presents a slightly different vantage point on the punitive-
compensatory ratio and reinforces the pattern displayed in Figure 3. Specifi-
cally, the boxplots in Figure 4 suggest minimal, though observable, variation
in the dispersion of the punitive and compensatory damage ratio over the
years and between trial modes. Although the outside values do not appear to
suggest any coherent pattern, separation between the 75th and 25th percen-
tiles (the upper and lower borders of the boxes) evidences some discernable
variation. To the extent that any trend emerges, what is hinted is that in 2001
30A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the entire untransformed ratio distributions yields p = 0.287.
31Stanton A. Glantz, Primer of Biostatistics 165 (5th ed. 2002).
32The power calculation employs the standard deviations observed in Table 1 and hypotheses
means that are 0.9 and 1.0.
33For a discussion of kernel density estimation, see B.W. Silverman, Density Estimation for
Statistics and Data Analysis (1986).
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Figure 3 : Kernel density estimates.
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Figure 4 : Punitive-compensatory award ratio (logs) by trial mode and year.
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separation between the 75th and 25th percentiles regained the 1992 value
after a slight dip during 1996, especially for judge trials.
Perhaps the most remarkable finding in Figure 4 is the stability in the
median punitive-compensatory damages ratios for judges and juries over
time. The line dissecting each box denotes the ratio median. If one drew a
line connecting the medians, the line would be close to straight, as the ratio
median consistently hovers just below 1.0. What this suggests, of course, is
not only that little descriptive difference emerges between judges and juries
in terms of their punitive and compensatory damage ratios, but also that
judge and jury damage ratios remain stable over time.
The stability in the ratios over time reflects underlying stability in both
their components over time. No statistically significant variation exists in the
inflation-adjusted punitive award level over the three time periods (ANOVA
p = 0.320). Similarly, no statistically significant variation exists in the
inflation-adjusted compensatory award level over the three time periods in
punitive damages cases (ANOVA p = 0.581). Median award levels also have
not significantly increased over the three time periods (Kruskal-Wallis
p = 0.517 for punitive awards; Kruskal-Wallis p = 0.460 for compensatory
awards). The absence of noticeable increase in award levels is consistent with
the Bureau of Justice Statistics report that, across all cases in the Civil Justice
Survey data, the median jury trial award decreased from a median of $65,000
in 1992 to $37,000 in 2001. It is also consistent with the absence of evidence
of an increase in recoveries in class actions from 1993 through 2002.34
B. The Decision to Award Punitive Damages
Punitive damage award rates are of interest independent of award levels. As
Table 1 indicates, even in trials won by plaintiffs, awards of punitive damages
are rare. Prior results indicate that judges and juries award punitive damages
at similar rates.35 The cumulative Civil Justice Survey data for 1996 and 2001,
34Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An
Empirical Study, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 27 (2004).
35Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, supra note 3. Hersch and Viscusi report judge-jury differences
in the decision to award punitive damages, but in the only analysis in which they account for the
sample design, the jury trial dummy variable was not statistically significant. Hersch & Viscusi,
supra note 2, at 31 tbl.8 (showing statistically insignificant jury effect when sampling weights
(that is the study design) are taken into account). Hersch and Viscusi incorrectly assert that
differences in results between them and Eisenberg et al. are attributable to induced multicol-
linearity by Eisenberg et al. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 2, at 3, 34. The results in the models
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which now provide two years of judge trial and jury trial data, permit more
refined analysis. We present here the first analysis of these data that explore
cases involving bodily injury separately from cases that do not.
As Figure 5 illustrates, punitive award rates for judges and juries are
similar for motor vehicle cases but differ for other aggregated case types.
Judge and jury propensity to award punitive damages in motor vehicle cases
was similar, and low. Punitive awards occurred in not more than 2.2 percent
of successful plaintiff trials in all years for both adjudicators. But, after
separating out motor vehicle cases, judges and juries awarded punitive
damages at quite different rates in bodily jury and no-bodily-injury cases.
Specifically, judges were far more likely than juries to award punitive
reported in Eisenberg et al. did not depend on the inclusion of the interaction term that Hersch
and Viscusi assert induced multicollinearity. Hersch and Viscusi may not have precisely repli-
cated the models or otherwise differed in the models they assessed. In any event, it now appears
that any jury effect is completely attributable to juries’ increased rate of punitive damages
awards in no-bodily-injury cases. Juries have a lower rate of punitive awards in bodily injury cases.
See Figure 5. This new finding should probably be the focus of at least part of the future
discussion about juries, judges, and punitive damages. To claim that judge and jury rates of
punitive awards are the same or different now appears to be an oversimplification.
Figure 5 : Punitive award rate, by trial mode and case type.
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damages in cases where bodily injury existed outside of the motor vehicle
setting. In 1996 and 2001 combined, in cases won at trial by plaintiffs, juries
awarded punitive damages in 102 of 4,591 (2.2 percent) bodily injury cases
and judges awarded punitive damages in 28 of 460 (6.1 percent) bodily
injury cases. For the same years, juries awarded punitive damages in 170 of
1,464 (11.6 percent) no-bodily-injury cases and judges awarded punitive
damages in 74 of 2,110 (3.5 percent) of no-bodily injury cases. Both differ-
ences are highly statistically significant (p  0.001). Figure 5 indicates that
these differences are consistent across the two time periods that include both
judge and jury trials.
So judge-jury similarity in punitive award levels is not fully mirrored in
the decision to award punitive damages. We explore this topic in greater
detail in regression analyses reported in Section IV.
IV. Regression Models of Punitive Damages
Without accounting for selection, discussed in Section V, our results indicate
that juries and judges are similar in assessing the relation between punitive
and compensatory damages, but differ in the decision to award punitive
damages. This section explores whether these results survive in regression
models that simultaneously account for more than one factor. We first
consider the degree to which compensatory awards can explain punitive
awards, conditional on a punitive award having been given.36 We then con-
sider models of the decision to award punitive damages, with a particular
focus on Figure 5’s difference between judges and juries across case types.
A. Modeling the Level of Punitive Damages Awards
Tables 4 and 5 report results from two distinct though related models. They
show that a case’s compensatory award remains the most powerful predictor
36For a sampling of opinion, compare Eisenberg et al., Predictability, supra note 8 (discussing
the relation between compensatory and punitive damages), with A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are
Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg
et al., 26 J. Legal Stud. 663 (1997) (same). See also W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive
Damages Awards, 53 Emory L.J. 1405, 1414 tbl.4 (2004) (finding no statistically significant
relation between untransformed compensatory and punitive damages but finding a significant
relation when the damages are logarithmically transformed for a blockbuster awards sub-
sample); Eisenberg & Wells, The Significant Association, supra note 8.
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of punitive awards and punitive-compensatory ratio. We analyze the 539
cases where the plaintiff prevailed and won a nonzero compensatory award.37
For both tables, Column A, the most parsimonious model, involves a single
independent variable—compensatory damages award. In Column B we gen-
erate a slightly modified model by including a dummy variable signaling the
independent influence of a jury (vs. a bench) trial to test whether trial mode
exerts any influence. Results from yet another model variation that includes
an interaction term are presented in Column C.38 The importance of com-
pensatory damages for predicting punitive damages emerges from a com-
parison among the three columns and between the two separate tables.
Notably, compensatory damages’ coefficients achieve statistical significance
in all three variants for both models.
Table 4 presents results from our models of punitive damages award
levels. In all three models, only the compensatory damages coefficient
achieves statistical significance. This finding is consistent with our prior
37We exclude from our analyses the 12 cases where punitive damages were awarded even though
no compensatory damages were awarded. See supra note 14 and, for a general discussion, see
Eisenberg et al., Predictability, supra note 8, at 629–30.
38We include alternative results for both Column B and C in response to multicollinearity
concerns raised by Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 2, 33–34. The results illustrate that, as it bears
on the influence of compensatory damages, the inclusion or exclusion of either a jury trial
dummy variable or the interaction variable (or both) makes little difference.
Table 4: Regression Models of Punitive Damages (Log) Levels
A B C
Compensatory damages
(log)
0.835** (0.040) 0.835** (0.038) 0.843** (0.046)
Jury trial dummy
(1 = yes)
— -0.029 (0.026) 0.009 (0.145)
Jury trial ¥ log of
compensatory
— — -0.008 (0.029)
Constant 0.593** (0.197) 0.639** (0.199) 0.599* (0.236)
Model significance 0.000 0.000 0.000
R 2 0.577 0.578 0.578
N 539 539 539
Note: *p  0.05; **p  0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992–2001.
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findings from the 1991–1992 data as well as the 1996 data.39 Moreover,
results in Column A demonstrate that this single variable, compensatory
damages, explains 0.577 of the variance of punitive damage award levels. The
additional independent variables in the alternative models (Columns B and
C) add little explanatory power and none of the additional variables achieve
statistical significance. Finally, if one assumes that the compensatory award is
a rational proxy for harm caused by the defendant, and evidence supports
the reasonableness of such an assumption,40 the compensatory award vari-
able serves something like a control for differences across judge and jury
cases.
Table 5 presents results from our models of the ratio of the punitive
and compensatory awards (log). This dependent variable permits us to
consider whether judges and juries systematically differ in the amount of
punitive damages they award per unit of compensatory damages. The overall
picture that emerges closely resembles the picture from Table 4. Specifically,
the compensatory award is the single best predictor of variation in
39Eisenberg et al., Predictability, supra note 8, at 648 tbl.5 (1991–1992 data); Eisenberg et al.,
Juries, Judges, supra note 3, at 772–74 tbl.5 (1996 data).
40See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New
Empirical Evidence, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 315, 364–65 (1999); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh,
Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation System Fair? 24 L. & Soc’y
Rev. 997, 1025 (1990); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical
Perspective, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 849, 868–70 (1998).
Table 5: Regression Models of Punitive-Compensatory Ratios
A B C
Compensatory damages
(log)
-0.052* (0.021) -0.052* (0.021) -0.056* (0.024)
Jury trial dummy
(1 = yes)
— -0.011 (0.007) -0.027 (0.056)
Jury trial ¥ log of
compensatory
— — 0.003 (0.011)
Constant 1.230** (0.111) 1.247** (0.115) 1.264** (0.131)
Model significance 0.012 0.028 0.067
R 2 0.063 0.066 0.066
N 539 539 539
Note: *p  0.05; **p  0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992–2001.
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punitive-compensatory awards (log) ratio. Moreover, compensatory
damages’ significance persists across all three models.
Results in Tables 4 and 5 differ, however, in two slight ways. First, as a
predictor of variance in the dependent variable, our punitive-compensatory
awards (log) ratio model is weaker than our punitive damages awards
model.41 Second, in one of the variants of our punitive-compensatory awards
ratio models (Column B), trial mode achieves somewhat more significance
(p = 0.164). Table 5 suggests that jury trials have a lower ratio of punitive to
compensatory awards.42 The independent influence of trial mode, however,
was neither particularly strong nor robust as it did not achieve significance in
any of the models. The Appendix reports similar models with explanatory
variables added for party status and case type. The results do not materially
differ from those in our simpler models.
The assertion that punitive damages are absurd often proxies for an
assertion that they bear no meaningful relation to compensatory damages.
Tables 4 and 5, however, as well as earlier figures, imply the contrary. How
good are the models of punitive damages at explaining award levels? One
logical point of reference is compensatory damages models in other
studies. Comparisons to models from other studies should be viewed cau-
tiously due to different methodologies, differences in independent vari-
ables used, and different classes of cases examined. These cautions aside,
however, comparisons between punitive damages models and compensa-
tory damages models provide some basis for assessing the efficacy of the
punitive damages models. Results in Table 4 illustrate that models that
include compensatory damages explain over one-half the variance in puni-
tive damages award levels. Notably, compensatory damages models do not
regularly achieve this level of explanatory power.43 Ironically, in at least one
41For the narrow purposes of this discussion, we construe the models’ strength for this purpose
solely as a function of the R 2 statistic.
42Because our ratio was constructed by dividing the punitive award (log) by the compensatory
award (log), a reduced ratio in this context can be achieved by juries awarding either smaller
punitive or larger compensatory damages.
43For a sampling of studies modeling compensatory damages see, for example, James S. Kakalik
et al., Variation in Asbestos Litigation Compensation and Expenses, 56 (RAND, 1984) (model
of compensatory awards (log) paid to asbestos case plaintiffs generates an adjusted R 2 of 0.34);
Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 40, at 1020–23 (models of medical malpractice award levels achieve
adjusted R 2s ranging from 0.22 to 0.51; models limited to jury trials did not exceed 0.47). For
a model of punitive damage award levels as a function of compensatory damages with even
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respect, therefore, punitive damage levels may be more explainable than
compensatory award levels.
B. Modeling the Decision to Award Punitive Damages
As explored in earlier punitive damages research,44 juries and judges process
different patterns of cases. For example, punitive damages tend to be
awarded in intentional tort and fraud cases. About 60 percent of plaintiff
trial wins in the data’s fraud cases are jury trials; about 80 percent of plaintiff
trial wins in intentional tort cases are jury trials. For products liability cases,
over 90 percent of trial wins are jury trials. Differential case routing across
categories may mask a judge-jury difference, rendering similar observed,
aggregate rates of awarding punitive damages misleading. More detailed
analysis should help account for the makeup of cases by subject area and
other factors.
Models of the decision to award punitive damages, reported in earlier
work,45 indicate that the decision should be linked to the nature of the
defendant’s behavior. The best available proxy for such behavior is the type
of case. On average, for example, one expects defendant behavior to have
been worse in an intentional tort case than in a case involving mere negli-
gence. Prior empirical work confirms this pattern.46 Therefore, in modeling
the decision to award punitive damages, we include dummy variables for case
categories and expect case categories involving intentional misbehavior to
have the highest punitive award rates. A second factor that likely influences
the punitive award is the level of the compensatory award. Other things
being equal, behavior that causes more harm is worse than behavior that
causes less harm, and might be expected to be punished more severely. We
approximate the degree of harm caused by using the compensatory damages
award in each case.
greater explanatory power than what we report, see Schmit et al., Punitive Damages: Punish-
ment or Further Compensation? 55 J. Risk Insurance 453 (1988).
44Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, supra note 3.
45Eisenberg et al., supra note 8, at 644–47.
46Id. at 645.
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Evidence exists that jurors react differently to corporate and individual
defendants.47 We include in the models three litigant pairs: actions by indi-
viduals only versus individuals only, actions by individuals only versus non-
individuals, and actions by nonindividuals versus nonindividuals. The
individuals versus individuals pairing serves as the reference category.
To account for locale in the models that follow, we use statistical
models that account for the clustering of the data at the county level. To
account for the sample design, we use the BJS designated strata and weight
the data in accordance with BJS-provided weights. In some models, we report
unweighted results. Since punitive damages law is a state-level factor, we
include dummy variables for the states that have more than one county in
the data.48 Figure 5 indicates that punitive damages award rates vary materi-
ally across adjudicator in bodily injury and non-bodily-injury cases. We there-
fore model these classes of cases separately.
Table 6 reports the results. It indicates that, in no-bodily-injury cases,
juries award punitive damages more frequently than judges. In bodily injury
cases, however, the effect is in the opposite direction. The sign on the jury
dummy variable is always negative and sometimes statistically significant,
depending on whether Harris County, Texas is included. In the models that
most fully account for the full sample and study design, Models (1) and (2),
the jury dummy variable points most strongly in opposite directions in the
bodily injury and no-bodily-injury cases.
Table 6 also shows that the size of the compensatory award relates
differently to the existence of a punitive award depending on the bodily
injury status of the case. In non-bodily-injury cases, the coefficient is substan-
tial and highly significant in all models, as one would expect. Greater harm
is associated with an increased likelihood of a punitive award. In bodily injury
47Valerie P. Hans & Williams S. Lofquist, Jurors’ Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases:
Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L. & Soc’y Rev. 85 (1992); Robert J.
MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the
“Deep-Pockets” Hypothesis, 30 L. & Soc’y Rev. 121, 140 (1996). However, this difference does
not necessarily translate into hostility to corporations. Lempert, supra note 3, at 455. Jurors may
react especially negatively to misbehavior by insurance companies. Valerie P. Hans & Nicole
Vadino, Whipped by Whiplash? The Challenges of Jury Communication in Lawsuits Involving
Connective Tissue Injury, 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 569, 580–82 (2000); Eisenberg & Wells, Predictability
on Appeal, supra note 8, at 67 (punitive/compensatory damages ratios are highest in insurer
misbehavior cases). But juries generally are skeptical about plaintiffs’ claims. Hans & Vadino,
supra, at 572–77.
48To save space we do not report results for the state dummy variables in Table 6.
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cases, however, the compensatory award coefficient is small and insignifi-
cant. Greater harm plays little role in explaining whether a punitive award
was given. This stronger relation in no-bodily-injury cases between the com-
pensatory award and whether punitive damages are awarded persists in both
judge and jury trials.
In all relevant models, intentional torts, fraud, and employment cases
are associated with increased frequency of punitive awards. Neither products
liability nor medical malpractice cases are associated with high rates of
punitive awards. These case-category findings echo findings in virtually all
other studies of punitive damages.
The negative signs on the litigant pair dummy variables indicate that
punitive damages are most likely in cases involving individuals suing
individuals.
V. Discussion
Both core results from Section III survive in Section IV’s regression analyses.
Juries and judges award about the same amount of punitive damages per
dollar of compensatory damages. The simplest explanation of this similarity
is that judges and juries behave similarly. This section suggests that this
simple explanation likely survives selection effects considerations, as best we
can model them. However, the simple explanation seems less satisfactory in
explaining juries’ and judges’ facially different treatment of bodily injury
cases and no-bodily-injury cases. Here, selection effects seem a likely part of
the explanation. An additional new result is the absence of evidence that
compensatory awards influence the decision to award punitive damages in
bodily injury cases. This section also discusses that result.
A. Selection Effect Considerations
Interpreting our results requires considering the nonrandom routing of
cases between judges and juries. Table 1 suggests that large-stakes cases tend
to be adjudicated by juries. Analysis of the 1996 Civil Justice Survey data
suggested that one expects juries to see a sample of cases that is biased in
favor of strong candidates for punitive awards.49 A study in which the higher
49Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, supra note 3.
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stakes, more punitive damages prone cases are in fact being routed to judges
should be regarded as more remarkable than any of our findings.
1. Selection Attributable to Case Routing Between Judge and Jury
If plaintiffs select juries for cases with high probabilities of punitive awards,
our results may overstate the juries’ propensity to award punitive damages
and could be interpreted as precluding rejection of the hypothesis that
judges are more likely than juries to award punitive damages. If judges
saw the same group of high punitive probability cases that juries likely
see, analysis might reveal a greater tendency by judges to award punitive
damages, and to award higher punitive damages.
Another possible routing effect relates to the perceived greater reliabil-
ity of judges compared to juries. Plaintiffs may regard judges as more reli-
able, and thereby opt for trial before judges in their strongest cases on the
merits.50 Similarly, the plaintiff with a strong punitive damages case may opt
for a judge trial to avoid the less reliable jury because the jury might refuse
to grant a punitive award in a case that merits an award. If such routing
occurs, then one might observe judges awarding punitive damages at a
greater rate than juries across all cases and defendants opting for jury trials
when the case for punitive damages is strongest. However, perceptions that
juries are more likely to award punitive damages, and more likely to award
more in punitive damages, are widespread. Indeed, until the 1996 Civil
Justice Survey data were gathered and first analyzed, the surprisingly promi-
nent role of judges in the punitive damages area was largely unknown.
Systematically seeking the reliable judge to obtain a punitive damages award,
when judges are not perceived as even awarding punitive damages, seems an
unlikely effect. But, as before, this explanation cannot be eliminated based
on our data and could mask real judge-jury differences.
2. Selection Attributable to Case Settlement
As noted in analyzing the CTCN 1996 data, since juries are believed to be
more unpredictable than judges, especially in high-award cases, defendants
may choose to settle cases that have high probabilities of large punitive
50Id.
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awards.51 Trials in cases in which jurors’ propensity to award punitive
damages is strongest may never be observed. Juries are viewed as so much
wilder than judges that they only rarely get to act in those cases in which their
behavior would be expected to be wildest.52
The most important empirical development on this front is a study of
the effect of punitive award requests on settlement in Georgia tort cases.53
Eaton et al. assessed the impact of punitive damages claims on the processing
of tort cases. They found little impact on case processing.
The results show that contrary to the expectation of many critics (e.g., Polinsky,
1997; Priest, 1996) the decision to seek punitive damages has no statistically
significant impact on most phases of the litigation process. Specifically, we found
that the decision to seek punitive damages had no effect on (1) whether a case
filed in any given year was disposed or pending; (2) whether a case that was
disposed was done so by trial or by some other procedure, including settlement;
(3) whether a case that was disposed by means other than a trial was more likely
to have been settled; and (4) whether a case that was disposed by means other
than a trial was more likely to have been disposed by a voluntary dismissal
without prejudice so that it could be re-filed.54
51Id.
52E.g., David Segal, Tag-Team Lawyers Make Businesses Blink; HMOs Latest to Grapple with
Threat of Investor-Scaring Mega-Verdicts, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 1999, at A1, 1999 WL 23314332.
Studies funded by industry or tort reform groups, which find evidence that punitive damages
often are requested, conclude that the frequency of such requests poses a serious problem.
J. Clark Kelso & Kari C. Kelso, An Analysis of Punitive Damages in California Courts, 1991–
2000, at 5 n.3 (unpublished manuscript); John H. Sullivan, New State Data Confirms Runaway
Abuse of Punitive Damages (1997), available at http://www.cjac.org/research/
punitivedamages.pdf. A study that followed up the tallying of claims for punitive damages by
studying whether awards were in fact obtained suggests the need for caution in interpreting the
effect of punitive damages claiming rates. Eaton et al. found that 3,763 of 25,560 (14.7 percent)
tort cases in Georgia state courts involved claims for punitive damages. These 3,763 cases yielded
15 punitive damages awards, with the awards being disproportionately made by judges, not
juries. Thomas A. Eaton, Susette M. Talarico & Richard E. Dunn, Another Brick in the Wall: An
Empirical Look at Georgia Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1049, 1094 (2000). See
also Eaton et al., supra note 8. Sullivan, supra, for example, reports high rates of claims for
punitive damages but does not report the resulting yield in actual punitive awards.
53Eaton et al., supra note 8.
54Id.
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The authors noted the consistency of their findings with those of three other
articles.55 In addition, analysis of the 1996 CTCN data concluded that little
evidence existed to support the belief that the threat of punitive damages
cast a detectably long shadow.
So we doubt that case selection and the settlement process explain our
core punitive damages filings. For award levels, the finding of judge-jury
similarity may present no analytic difficulty. Judges and juries tend to award
similar amounts of punitive damages per compensatory dollar awarded. For
the decision to award, however, while the overall punitive award rates are
not substantially different, significant difference does exist in subclasses of
cases—notably bodily injury and non-bodily-injury cases.
3. The Bodily Injury Finding
A facial explanation of judge-jury similarity is less plausible in explaining
Figure 5 and Table 6’s finding that juries award punitive damages less often
than judges in bodily injury cases and more often in no-bodily-injury cases.
Since, unlike the punitive-compensatory relation results, the core finding
is of difference, not similarity, something must help explain the difference.
One explanation is that judges are in fact more prone to award punitive
damages in bodily injury cases and less prone to do so in financial injury
cases. But that explanation seems counterintuitive. Whatever their approach
to financial injury cases, conventional wisdom is that juries, not judges,
should be the relative pushovers for injured plaintiffs.
Another possible explanation for the difference in judge versus jury
behavior based on the presence or absence of bodily injury may be in the
types of cases that are collapsed into the non-bodily-injury category. These
include fraud, defamation, professional malpractice, employment discrimi-
nation, conversion, rental/lease, tortious interference, and partnership dis-
putes. One of the characteristics that these case types often have in common
(compared to bodily injury cases) is the presence of a preexisting relation-
ship of implied trust—fiduciary, employment, or contractual—between the
plaintiff and defendant that is less likely to occur in most bodily injury cases
(auto tort, premises liability, product liability). It may be that juries, more
than judges, perceive the violation of this preexisting relationship as egre-
gious, and thus more deserving of punishment for the defendant, than cases
55Id.
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that do not involve a preexisting relationship. We do not have evidence that
juries and judges in fact respond differently to breaches of trust but this
explanation is worth exploring.
The type of evidence presented in bodily injury versus non-bodily-
injury cases may also affect judges and juries differently. Absent egregious
circumstances, in many cases, it may not be that easy for juries to distinguish
evidence of mere negligence from willful or malicious conduct in cases
involving bodily injury. In non-bodily-injury cases, the evidence of willful or
malicious conduct (rather than accident) may be more straightforward.
Judges’ repeated observations of trials, experience that most jurors lack, may
enable them to more confidently rank misbehavior in bodily injury cases.
However, it is not clear that judges would react less negatively than jurors to
evidence of willful or malicious conduct.
Here, then, no readily available explanation seems fully satisfactory and
selection may well be at work. If juries are perceived as more likely to award
punitive damages than judges in bodily injury cases, perhaps less punitives-
worthy cases are routed to juries. When juries turn out to behave similarly to
judges, one would observe those less punitive-damages-worthy cases resulting
in relatively fewer punitive awards by juries.56 This does not explain juries’
observed higher frequency of punitive awards in financial injury cases.
Perhaps the stereotypical view of juries is correct here and less case routing
goes on to obliterate that tendency by the time of observed outcomes.
B. The Relation Between the Compensatory Award and the Decision to Award
Punitive Damages
Table 6 indicates that, in no-bodily-injury cases, the magnitude of the com-
pensatory award is positively and statistically significantly associated with the
existence of an award of punitive damages. This is as expected. As the harm,
as represented by the compensatory award, increases, the likelihood of
imposing a punitive award should be expected to increase. Perhaps more
interesting is the absence of evidence that compensatory awards influence
the decision to award punitive damages in bodily injury cases. It may be that
physical harm to the victim, regardless of the level of monetary harm, is a
sufficient proxy for serious harm so that the amount of compensatory
56Cf. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 15 (explaining different win rates before judges and
juries on the basis of case routing).
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damages no longer influences the decision to award punitive damages.
Misbehavior resulting in physical harm is per se sufficient to support a
punitive award. Only the quality of the behavior matters at that point, not the
level of the monetary harm.
VI. Conclusion
We report evidence across 10 years and three major data sets that: (1) juries
and judges award punitive damages in approximately the same ratio to
compensatory damages, (2) little evidence of increasing levels of punitive
awards exists, and (3) juries’ and judges’ tendencies to award punitive
damages differs in bodily injury and no-bodily-injury cases. The similarity in
punitive-compensatory ratios probably suggests that juries and judges behave
similarly with respect to award amounts. The differences in punitive award
rates more likely are a function of case selection than of jurors’ relative
harshness in bodily injury cases.
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Appendix
Appendix Table 1: Full Regression Models of Punitive Damages
(log) Levels
Independent Variables A B C
Compensatory damages
(log)
0.767** (0.057) 0.767** (0.057) 0.725** (0.103)
Jury trial dummy
(1 = yes)
— 0.012 (0.028) -0.135 (0.250)
Jury trial ¥ log of
compensatory
— — 0.031 (0.051)
Party Status
Individual vs.
nonindividual
0.182* (0.082) 0.188* (0.083) 0.192* (0.084)
Nonindividual vs.
nonindividual
-0.036 (0.214) -0.032 (0.214) -0.028 (0.213)
Selected Case Types
Premises liability -0.466* (0.207) -0.477* (0.206) -0.496* (0.210)
Product liability
(including asbestos)
-0.070 (0.284) -0.068 (0.283) -0.067 (0.280)
Intentional tort -0.203 (0.101) -0.206* (0.101) -0.206* (0.101)
Medical and
professional
malpractice
-0.320* (0.146) -0.320* (0.146) -0.314* (0.144)
Fraud -0.083 (0.121) -0.090 (0.127) -0.098 (0.129)
Employment
discrimination or
dispute
-0.026 (0.137) -0.023 (0.135) -0.019 (0.134)
Rental/lease
agreement
-0.339* (0.138) -0.333* (0.139) -0.338* (0.142)
Selected Case
Characteristics
Bodily injury
(non-motor-vehicle)
0.504** (0.114) 0.502** (0.115) 0.507*** (0.115)
No bodily injury 0.298* (0.123) 0.293* (0.124) 0.293* (0.123)
Constant 0.595* (0.288) 0.574 (0.300) 0.779 (0.499)
Model significance 0.000 0.000 0.000
R 2 0.532 0.532 0.533
N 494 494 494
Note: *p  0.05; **p  0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference group for party
status is individual versus individual; reference group for selected case type is the aggregate of
all case types not represented by dummy variables; reference group for the selected case
characteristic is no bodily injury. Models account for clustering at the county-site level and the
stratified sampling pattern. State dummy variables for those states with more than one county in
the data are included in the models but not reported.
Source: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992–2001.
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Appendix Table 2: Full Regression Models of Punitive Damages
(Log) Ratios
Independent Variables A B C
Compensatory damages
(log)
-0.071* (0.035) -0.071* (0.035) -0.112 (0.057)
Jury trial dummy (1 = yes) — -0.008 (0.011) -0.150 (0.109)
Jury trial ¥ log of
compensatory
— — 0.029 (0.021)
Party Status
Individual vs.
nonindividual
0.042 (0.022) 0.037 (0.024) 0.041 (0.023)
Nonindividual vs.
nonindividual
-0.001 (0.048) -0.004 (0.049) -0.001 (0.048)
Selected Case Types
Premises liability -0.074 (0.053) -0.066 (0.058) -0.084 (0.052)
Product liability (including
asbestos)
0.051 (0.087) 0.050 (0.087) 0.051 (0.085)
Intentional tort -0.004 (0.053) -0.002 (0.056) -0.001 (0.056)
Medical and professional
malpractice
-0.037 (0.029) -0.037 (0.029) -0.031 (0.028)
Fraud -0.033 (0.035) -0.028 (0.032) -0.036 (0.035)
Employment
discrimination or
dispute
-0.012 (0.025) -0.013 (0.025) -0.009 (0.025)
Rental/lease agreement -0.099* (0.040) -0.103* (0.043) -0.108* (0.047)
Selected Case Characteristics
Bodily injury
(non-motor-vehicle)
0.066 (0.042) 0.067 (0.041) 0.072 (0.038)
No bodily injury 0.069* (0.032) 0.072* (0.034) 0.071* (0.033)
Constant 1.243** (0.178) 1.258** (0.191) 1.456** (0.295)
Model significance 0.000 0.000 0.000
R 2 0.135 0.136 0.150
N 494 494 494
Note: *p  0.05; **p  0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference group for party
status is individual versus individual; reference group for selected case type is the aggregate of
all case types not represented by dummy variables; reference group for the selected case
characteristic is no bodily injury. Models account for clustering at the county-site level and the
stratified sampling pattern. State dummy variables for those states with more than one county in
the data are included in the models but not reported.
Source: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992–2001.
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